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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In March 2010, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 holding that 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a class action to 
proceed even where the state that created the cause of action explicitly 
prohibits that claim from being brought as a class action.  Shady Grove 
is the latest in the long line of cases applying the Erie doctrine.  Shady 
Grove’s splintered opinion, with its unlikely line-up of justices (Scalia, 
Sotomayor, Roberts, and Thomas plurality; Stevens concurrence; 
Ginsburg, Alito, Breyer, Kennedy dissent), demonstrates the complexity 
of the substance/procedure distinction of the Erie cases. 
 
* J.D., Stanford Law School, 2010; B.A., St. Norbert College, 2005.  I am grateful to Professor 
Janet Alexander of Stanford Law School for her helpful guidance and comments in developing this 
piece.  Furthermore, I wish to thank Robert Garcia, Clifford Davidson, and N. Andrew Sfeir for 
their suggestions. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).  
1
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This Article examines the Court’s decision in Shady Grove, 
concluding that Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion has the better 
argument—his approach is the most consonant with precedent and the 
least disruptive to the careful balance the Court has struck with its Erie 
line of cases.  Part II examines Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, and 
considers its strengths and weaknesses.  I then turn to Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion, concluding that it rests on a fundamental 
misapplication of the Erie doctrine, though she admirably attempts to 
give teeth to the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling 
Act—a limitation that the Erie doctrine admittedly  ignores.  Part III 
considers the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, who suggests a 
middle ground test that, while initially appealing, collapses under the 
weight of a closer analysis.  It is not yet clear which opinion will provide 
controlling precedent in future cases, and this paper argues that the 
plurality opinion should control as the narrowest ground of decision, 
rather than Justice Stevens’s concurrence. 
I conclude with a discussion of the case’s ironic result and the 
lesson Shady Grove provides for future Congresses that might attempt to 
achieve substantive outcomes by regulating procedure.  Shady Grove 
reached federal court through diversity jurisdiction made possible only 
by a Republican Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA), which, ironically, was passed with the purpose of reducing the 
number of class actions.  Since its enactment, CAFA has become a tool 
for the plaintiff’s bar—leading to even more class action suits.  
Congressional regulations of procedure are uniquely capable of 
backfiring by producing results inconsistent with the legislative purpose.  
II.  SHADY GROVE V. ALLSTATE:  SCALIA PLURALITY AND GINSBURG 
DISSENT 
A. Facts and Posture 
Shady Grove came before the Court under a set of facts reminiscent 
of a civil procedure law school exam.  Sonia E. Galvez of Maryland was 
injured in a car accident while driving her New York registered car on 
May 30, 2005.2  She was insured by Allstate, a citizen of Illinois.3  After 
the accident, Ms. Galvez received medical treatment for her injuries at 
 
 2. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008). 
 3. Id. at 1. 
2
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates in Maryland.4  The substantive law 
governing the case is that of New York, where her car was registered.5  
New York’s insurance law requires that insurance companies pay 
benefits to customers within thirty days of receiving a properly 
documented claim; failure to make timely distribution of benefits results 
in a two percent interest charge per month.6  A separate New York 
statutory provision, in the state’s procedural code, prohibits class action 
suits for statutory minimum damages or penalties.7  In partial payment 
of her medical bills, Ms. Galvez assigned her right to insurance benefits 
to Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates—a claim that Allstate paid, 
though not by the thirty-day deadline mandated by law.8  Allstate then 
refused to pay the statutory interest of two-percent per month required 
by statute.9  Alleging that Allstate regularly refused to pay the statutory 
penalty amount, Shady Grove filed a class action suit in the Eastern 
District of New York, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)(2),10 amended in 2005 under CAFA to expand federal diversity 
jurisdiction over class actions.11  The Petitioners proposed a class of 
 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. Id. at 5-6. 
 6. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2010).   
 7. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2010) provides in relevant part: 
§ 901.  Prerequisites to a class action 
(b) Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery 
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a 
penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be 
maintained as a class action. 
Id. 
 8. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 6. Section 1332(d)(2) provides that: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter 
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 
and is a class action in which—  
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant;  
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a 
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or  
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a 
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 11. Before passage of the CAFA in 2005, section 1332 required complete diversity of parties, 
even in class actions, and thus, Petitioners would not have been able to assert diversity jurisdiction 
in this matter.  Congress passed CAFA in response to business concerns that state courts were too 
friendly to class action lawsuits.  The findings and purposes of CAFA indicate that, from the mid-
1990s through 2005, there had been “abuses of the class action device” that “harmed plaintiffs with 
legitimate claims and defendants who [had] acted responsibly,” and “undermined public respect for 
our judicial system.”  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2005) (setting forth 
3
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over 1,000 members—well in excess of the 100 required by CAFA—
with statutory penalty damages exceeding five million dollars.12  
Allstate responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Erie 
doctrine required that New York’s prohibition on class actions be 
applied, not Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as such 
the class action could not be maintained.13  The district court granted the 
motion to dismiss, and the Second Circuit affirmed.14  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and the Court heard oral arguments on 
November 2, 2009, releasing its opinion on March 31, 2010.15 
B. An Erie Background 
Before turning to an analysis of Shady Grove, a brief background 
discussion on Erie is necessary to provide the context of the case.  In 
Erie, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not permit federal courts 
hearing diversity cases to supplant state law with “federal general 
common law.”16  This accords with the two statutes on point—the Rules 
of Decision Act17 (RODA) and the Rules Enabling Act18 (REA):  the 
 
findings and purposes).  Specifically, Congress took state courts to task for “keeping cases of 
national importance out of Federal Court; sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against 
out-of-State defendants; and making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States 
and bind the rights of residents of those States.”  Id.; see also Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism 
from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act:  “The Political 
Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1930 (2008). 
 12. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 7. 
 13. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 11-12, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (2006) (No. 06 CV 1842 (NG) (KAM)), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 
LEXIS 38759.  In its Motion to Dismiss, Allstate argued that under the Erie line of cases and 
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988), Federal Rule 23 did not displace the New 
York prohibition on class actions.  Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, supra, at 11-12.  It relied 
heavily on Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), a class action for treble damages 
under the state’s anti-trust law.  The treble damages constituted a penalty under New York law, and 
under section 901(b), could not be maintained as a class action.  The Leider court found that the 
state statute and Rule 23 addressed different issues, and thus, could co-exist.  Respondent’s Motion 
to Dismiss, supra, at 11-12; Leider, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 290.  The Leider court found section 901(b) 
substantive for Erie purposes because application of Rule 23 would lead to forum-shopping—one of 
the twin aims Erie was meant to avoid.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 14. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assoc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 146 (2008).  The 
Second Circuit likewise found that there was no collision between Rule 23 and section 901(b).  The 
court noted that both Rule 23 and New York’s analogue class action procedural statute, section 
901(a), established the requirements for maintaining a class action.  However, the court found that 
“there is no analogue to [section 901(b)] in Rule 23.”  Id. at 143.  Thus, the court held that section 
901(b) is substantive for Erie purposes and operates co-extensively with Rule 23.  Id. at 144. 
 15. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 16. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).  RODA provides that: “The laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or 
4
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substantive law is supplied by the state, while the federal procedural 
rules apply.  In promulgating federal rules of procedure under REA, the 
Supreme Court may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”19  Of course, the line between procedure and substance is not 
always clear.  “[C]lassification of a law as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ 
for Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor.”20  Since Erie in 
1938, the Court has struggled to explain the doctrine.  For a while, it 
looked to whether a state statute was “outcome determinative,” and if so, 
it labeled it “substantive” and applied state law. 21  The Court moved 
away from this approach in Hanna v. Plumer.22  In Hanna, the Court 
found that, on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause, combined 
with Congress’s constitutional power to establish lower federal courts, 
Congress could “regulate matters which, though falling within the 
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable 
of classification as either.”23  In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,24 the Court 
announced the test for determining if a federal rule “abridge[s], 
enlarge[s], or modif[ies] any substantive right.”25  “The test must be 
whether a rule really regulates procedure—the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”26 
Together, Hanna and Sibbach hold that if there is a direct conflict 
between a federal rule and a state statute, the federal rule will supplant 
the state statute so long as the federal rule can rationally be classified as 
procedural and it, in fact, “really regulates procedure.”  This is so 
because if the federal rule is rationally capable of classification as 
procedural, then the Supremacy Clause requires the conflicting state law 
to give way.  If, on the other hand, there is not a direct conflict between 
the federal rule and the state statute, then Hanna requires that the 
“relatively unguided Erie”27 choice be made as to whether state or 
federal law applies, with RODA as the guide.  In making that choice, the 
 
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in 
cases where they apply.”  Id. 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
 21. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
 22. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 23. Id. at 472 (emphasis added). 
 24. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 25. Id. at 14; 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 26. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 27. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
5
Gaber: Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
8-GABER_44.4_8.7.11_ DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:39 AM 
984 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:979 
Court cautioned that the “[o]utcome-determination analysis was never 
intended to serve as a talisman,”28 and that the outcome-determination 
test “cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule:  
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”29  In that case, a court would consider 
whether application of the federal rule would lead to forum-shopping or 
inequitable administration of the laws, and if so, Erie would dictate that 
the federal rule give way to the state statute. 
But a court applying the REA analysis, where there is a direct 
conflict, would only assess the state statute for the purpose of 
determining if there is a conflict with a federal rule—to determine if the 
federal rule affects substantive rights in violation of the REA, the court 
would look only to the federal rule to see if it regulates procedure.30  
Unfortunately, the Court did not leave well enough alone.  In Gasperini 
v. Center for Humanities,31 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, 
stated that federal rules should be interpreted “with sensitivity to 
important state interests.”32  This command seemingly comports with the 
REA’s requirement that the federal rules of procedure not affect 
substantive rights.  But it marks a departure from Hanna and Sibbach—
one that Justice Scalia refuses to take in Shady Grove.33  I turn now to 
the Court’s decision in Shady Grove. 
C. Rule 23 v. Section 901(b):  Unavoidable Conflict 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas, Roberts, Sotomayor, and 
Stevens, wrote the majority opinion reversing the Second Circuit and 
finding that Rule 23 and section 901(b) of the New York procedural 
code were in conflict—“[b]oth of § 901’s subsections undeniably answer 
the same question as Rule 23:  whether a class action may proceed for a 
given suit.”34  But that was the only issue on which Justice Scalia was 
able to muster five votes.  Justice Stevens penned a separate concurring 
opinion, suggesting that in some cases, an ordinarily procedural state law 
 
 28. Id. at 466-67. 
 29. Id. at 468. 
 30. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010). 
 31. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 32. Id. at 427 n.7. 
 33. Justice Scalia acknowledges the obvious criticism of his position in favor of the Sibbach 
test, which is that it is difficult to determine if a federal rule “really regulates procedure” if one is 
not allowed to examine the state law to determine its substantive effect.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 
1445-46.  While this critique is valid, the opposite result, with the potential for variation in the 
meaning of the federal rules from state to state, “would be chaos.”  Id.  
 34. Id. at 1439. 
6
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might be so “sufficiently interwoven” with the state’s substantive law as 
to require it to supplant a federal rule.35  Justice Scalia devoted a large 
section of his opinion to refuting Justice Stevens, a section that Justice 
Sotomayor did not join.36 
Justice Scalia’s critical disagreement with the dissent, written by 
Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito, is 
based on whether Rule 23 is in conflict with New York’s law banning 
class actions for statutory penalties.  On this point, Justice Scalia has the 
better of the arguments.  Rule 23 provides that a class action may be 
“maintained” if “two conditions are met:  The suit must satisfy the 
criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one 
of the three categories of subdivision (b).”37  The New York statute, 
which is included in the state’s procedural code, discusses when class 
actions “may not be maintained.”38  At base, the federal statute, Rule 23, 
discusses when class actions may be maintained, and the New York 
statute, section 901(b), discusses when they may not be maintained.  
Rule 23 is completely silent about statutory penalty cases.  Very clearly, 
a statutory penalty class action, like the litigation in Shady Grove, is 
disallowed under the New York rule, and allowed under Rule 23—the 
conflict between the federal and state law could not be more direct. 
Justice Scalia rejects the Second Circuit’s argument that the New 
York law actually addresses a different question—whether a certain type 
or class of claims is eligible for class treatment.39  Under the Second 
Circuit’s reading, the dispute in Shady Grove would never reach the 
doorstep of Rule 23 because New York law would make it ineligible for 
maintenance as a class action.  But as Justice Scalia states, “the line 
between eligibility and certifiability is entirely artificial; both are 
preconditions for maintaining a class action.”40  The fact that the words 
are interchangeable is “a sure sign that . . . the distinction is made-to-
order.”41  Further support, as Justice Scalia notes, is found in specific 
federal claims that Congress has put outside Rule 23’s reach.42  Congress 
 
 35. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 1442, 1444 (plurality opinion). 
 37. Id. at 1437; FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 38. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2010). 
 39. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  Justice Scalia cites 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (2006) (addressing judicial review of 
alien removal orders).  Allstate argued in briefing that this fact demonstrated that Rule 23 was not 
all-inclusive, and thus, left room for the operation of section 901(b).  Brief for Respondent at 14, 
7
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believed that, unless it specifically excepted certain claims, cases 
meeting the requirements of Rule 23 would be permitted to proceed as 
class actions.  Therefore, had Congress meant to except from Rule 23’s 
coverage suits seeking statutory penalties, it would have done so 
explicitly. 
The dissenters, led by Justice Ginsburg, disagree that there is a 
direct conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b).  Justice Ginsburg’s 
analysis rests on ambiguous state legislative history and the conclusion 
that New York’s statute, which, by its terms, regulates when class 
actions may not be maintained, actually is a substantive cap on damages.  
Justice Ginsburg points to the signing statement of then-Governor, Hugh 
Carey of New York, who said that section 901(b) “‘empowers the court 
to prevent abuse of the class action device and provides a controlled 
remedy.’”43  She concludes, “The limitation was not designed with the 
fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind.  Indeed, suits seeking 
statutory damages are arguably best suited to the class device because 
individual proof of factual damages is unnecessary.”44  Justice Ginsburg 
goes on to conclude that  
New York’s decision instead to block class-action proceedings for 
statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except as a means to a 
manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single 
lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties—
remedies the New York Legislature created with individual suits in 
mind.45 
If section 901(b)’s drafters intended it to serve a “manifestly 
substantive end” as Justice Ginsburg concludes, why did the legislature 
choose to put it in the state’s procedural code?  And why did they use 
language that mimics the procedural language of Rule 23—whether 
suits may or may not be “maintained” as class actions?  Indeed, as Shady 
Grove argued at oral arguments,46 section 901(b) is not limited to actions 
based upon New York substantive law.  As petitioners argue in their 
brief, “[b]ecause New York has no power to determine the substantive 
 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 836 at *14.  The Court rejected this argument and instead found this fact 
detrimental to Allstate’s position.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438. 
 43. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Memorandum on 
Approving L. 1975, Ch.207, reprinted in 1975 N.Y. Laws, at 1748). 
 44. Id. at 1465. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008).  
8
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rights of litigants under federal statutes, or statutes of other states, the 
facial applicability to section 901(b) to actions brought under such 
statutes is incompatible with the notion that it defines substantive 
rights.”47 
True, as petitioners admitted at oral arguments,48 there are no 
examples of New York courts applying section 901(b) to actions based 
on other states’ substantive laws, though there have been cases applying 
it to federal substantive laws.49  This is hardly a convincing attack on the 
procedural nature of the law—after the New York courts initially 
decided the statute applied as a procedural rule to bar statutory penalty 
class actions in the federal cases, why would anyone else file such a 
claim in New York? 
Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that “[i]t is true that section 901(b) 
is not specifically limited to claims arising under New York law.  But 
neither is it expressly extended to claims arising under foreign law.”50  
Justice Ginsburg goes on to state that “New York legislators make law 
with New York plaintiffs and defendants in mind, i.e., as if New York 
were the universe,” suggesting that the legislature simply did not 
contemplate that New York courts might hear cases based on other 
states’ laws.51 
The implication, that New York would have to explicitly extend 
application of a rule to foreign claims in order for it to definitively 
classify that rule as procedural, is too stretched.  The state’s joinder 
rules, for example, say nothing about their explicit application to foreign 
claims.52  Under Justice Ginsburg’s theory, the absence of such an 
explicit statement might make the joinder rules substantive.  
Furthermore, the New York legislature included a provision in its 
procedural code granting full faith and credit to the judgments of foreign 
jurisdictions,53 belying Justice Ginsburg’s claim that the New York 
legislature operates under the impression that the legal universe consists 
solely of New York plaintiffs and defendants.  Finally, the state 
 
 47. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 36.   
 48. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 14. 
 49. See Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Cape Canaveral Tour & Travel, Inc., 799 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (rejecting the argument that section 901(b) was substantive and applying it to claim 
under federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act); Vickers v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 390 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (permitting class action under federal Truth in Lending Act 
because it expressly authorized class actions, as required by section 901(b)). 
 50. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. 
 52. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 601 (McKinney 2010). 
 53. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5402(b) (McKinney 2010). 
9
Gaber: Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
8-GABER_44.4_8.7.11_ DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:39 AM 
988 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:979 
legislature was explicit in the introduction to its procedural rules that 
“the civil practice law and rules shall govern the procedure in civil 
judicial proceedings in all courts of the state . . . .”54  The clarity of the 
statutory text undermines Justice Ginsburg’s turn to the legislative 
history, which itself is not exceptionally convincing. 
More alarming are the potential ramifications of Justice Ginsburg’s 
argument on future applications of Rule 23 in federal court.  Justice 
Ginsburg opens her dissent with the argument that section 901(b) is 
actually about damages: “The Court today approves Shady Grove’s 
attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award . . . .”55  
Justice Ginsburg conflates each class member’s claim with the class 
action case.  This is what every class action does—it is a procedural tool 
to permit claimants to aggregate many claims into one case.  It is 
impossible to ignore the implication of Justice Ginsburg’s argument on 
the operation of Rule 23—if accepted, her argument inescapably brings 
into question whether Rule 23 is truly procedural, or if it, in fact, is 
actually substantive, creating just the type of slippery slope Justice 
Ginsburg derides.56 
If it is true that section 901(b)—again, by its terms about 
“maintenance” of a class action—is actually a substantive cap on 
damages, then how does Rule 23 retain its procedural label?  It, too, is 
about when class actions may be maintained.  If the New York statute’s 
prohibition of class actions is really a cap on damages over a certain 
amount, then how is Rule 23 not actually a substantive grant of damages 
over a certain amount?  Accepting her argument, Rule 23 is actually a 
substantive expansion of litigating power for each claimant—leading to 
a large case award.  Justice Ginsburg, perhaps anticipating this argument 
(one that was not made by Justices Scalia or Stevens), preemptively 
argues that Rule 23 is, in fact, procedural. 
Rule 23 prescribes the considerations relevant to class certification and 
postcertification proceedings—but it does not command that a 
particular remedy be available when a party sues in a representative 
capacity.  Section 901(b), in contrast, trains on the latter issue.  
 
 54. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added). 
 55. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 1465 n.5.  Justice Ginsburg responds to the Petitioner’s argument that, if Allstate 
were to prevail, courts would always look to state law rather than Rule 23 when certifying classes, 
by stating that “[t]his slippery slope projection is both familiar and false,” and noting that “ Judges 
and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski to the bottom. ” Id. 
(citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 169 (1990)).  Perhaps that statement is so, 
but it assumes a slope with no slip. 
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Sensibly read, Rule 23 governs procedural aspects of class litigation, 
but allows state law to control the size of a monetary award a class 
plaintiff may pursue.57 
Justice Ginsburg draws a distinction that does not exist—or exists 
only on the basis of scant (and refutable) state legislative history.  Also, 
her last point is incorrect.  Section 901(b) says nothing about what a 
class plaintiff may pursue—it just says they cannot aggregate their 
claims.  On a purely textual basis, Rule 23 allows class actions where 
section 901(b) does not—they are precisely opposites.  At least for those 
particular cases, accepting Justice Ginsburg’s argument, one can easily 
argue that Rule 23 does not govern procedural aspects of class 
litigation—instead it actually operates as a substantive floor on damages, 
by allowing individual damages to be aggregated into a large case 
award—that, in theory, is just the sum of all individual claims, in 
practice, is larger because most individuals would not sue on their own.58  
Indeed, CAFA, the statute that expanded federal jurisdiction for class 
actions, specifically mandates that class actions governed under Rule 23 
in diversity cases involve damages in excess of five million dollars.59  
Under Justice Ginsburg’s analysis, Rule 23, particularly when operating 
in coordination with CAFA, is actually a substantive regulation about 
damages. 
It is not difficult to imagine that, if Justice Ginsburg had prevailed, 
a federal judge not fond of class actions60 might adopt this argument to 
declare, on an as-applied basis, that a certain run-of-the-mill class action 
suit under Rule 23 was impermissibly substantive—precisely for the 
reason that all class actions meet the superiority requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3).  They involve small individual claims, and without the class 
action mechanism, there would be little economic incentive for an 
individual to bring suit.61  So conceived, Rule 23 would run afoul of 
 
 57. Id. at 1465-66. 
 58. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft:  Consumer 
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842 (1974).  Landers 
argues that in a practical sense, Rule 23 created an action that otherwise did not exist because no 
one would bring many of the small individual claims that are aggregated into class actions—and 
that this treats businesses, who also often have no recourse for small individual claims against 
clients, unfairly.  Id. at 845-47. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). 
 60. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).  In Rhone-
Poulenc, Judge Posner reversed a grant of class certification for HIV-positive hemophiliacs on the 
concern that an unreviewable class certification grant could lead to “‘blackmail settlements.’” Id. at 
1298 (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)). 
 61. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note.  The Advisory Committee’s Note 
states that “[t]he interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call 
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section 34 of the Rules Enabling Act, which requires that the federal 
rules “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,”62 because 
the defendant would otherwise face no lawsuit. 
Of course, this argument is not what Justice Ginsburg intended—
she rejected it herself by declaring Rule 23 procedural;63 however, that is 
not the point.  Following Justice Ginsburg’s argument, to its natural 
conclusion, inevitably leads one to question the procedural status of Rule 
23—and that alone should suffice to demonstrate the dissent’s ill-
conception, given Rule 23’s consistent and widespread acceptance.64 
 
for denial of a class action.”  Id.  A class action suit will meet the superiority requirement where this 
is not the case—that is, “where each injured person’s limited damages would make individual 
litigation cost-prohibitive.”  ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND 
OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 245 (2000). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 63. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1466 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 64. The acceptance of Rule 23’s constitutionality, though unanimous among the Court—as 
demonstrated in Shady Grove—has not been entirely unanimous among commentators.  Martin 
Redish argues that Rule 23—and by extension the REA and the entirety of the Federal Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence—are unconstitutional because they are promulgated by the Supreme Court, 
and Congress only acts if it objects to them.  MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:  
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 228-32 (2009).  
Redish argues that class actions “undermine democracy . . . by the indirect manipulation of 
underlying substantive law, under the guise of a procedural mechanism.  In this manner, the class 
action contravenes basic dictates of legislative transparency and electoral accountability that are 
essential to the operation of a successful democratic system.”  Id. at 228. 
  Redish extends his criticism to the process established by the REA:  “the current class 
action rule is legislatively promulgated by the one branch of the federal government that is 
unrepresentative of and unaccountable to the electorate.”  Id. at 229.  He then concludes by 
suggesting “[f]or the modern class action rule to possess both constitutional and democratic 
legitimacy, it must be promulgated, in the first instance, through legislative enactment in accord 
with the constitutional dictates of bicameralism and presentment.”  Id.  To be sure, Redish 
acknowledges that as a practical matter, there is no reason to believe that the constitutionality of the 
REA, at least as declared by the Court, is in doubt.  Id. at 64.  He nonetheless doubts its 
constitutionality.  See also Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and 
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action:  A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
617, 641 (2010) (stating that cy pres awards to charities of unclaimed settlement funds violate the 
constitution by creating a trilateral, rather than bilateral, adjudicative system, turning a 
compensatory scheme into a civil fine, and violating the due process rights of defendants and absent 
class members); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the 
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2007) (arguing that the 
mandatory participation components of Rule 23 and the opt-out provisions are unconstitutional 
impositions on individual litigants’ autonomy under procedural due process). 
  While Redish raises interesting points, his main constitutional objection—that the REA’s 
process of Court-promulgated federal rules undermines democratic legitimacy—is unconvincing.  
First, Congress can always reject the rules.  Second, his argument relies on the suggestion that it is 
“political nonsense” that the rules regulate procedure internal to the operation of the courts—that 
the rules “impact the scope of substantive political choices.”  REDISH, supra, at 64.  However, as 
Justice Scalia states in Shady Grove, this “has no bearing on [the parties’] legal rights . . . [and is] 
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The better view—and that of five justices—is that there is a direct 
conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b).  Indeed, Justice Stevens, in 
his concurrence, says the dissenters should “argue within the Enabling 
Act’s framework” rather than deny a conflict.65 
III.  JUSTICE STEVENS’S “SUFFICIENTLY INTERWOVEN” TEST 
Justice Stevens begins his opinion by stating his agreement with 
Justice Scalia that Rule 23 applies in the case, but also that he agrees 
with Justice Ginsburg that “there are some state procedural rules that 
federal courts must apply in diversity cases because they function as part 
of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.”66  Justice 
Stevens announces the test that he would apply:  “[I]f a federal rule 
displaces a state rule that is procedural in the ordinary sense of the term, 
but sufficiently interwoven with the scope of a substantive right or 
remedy,”67 then the federal rule must give way to the state rule, lest the 
“substantive rights” sentence of the REA be violated. 
While Justice Stevens agrees with Justice Scalia that the relevant 
framework is provided by the REA, and not the RODA, Justice Stevens 
believes that the state law must be examined and that “federal courts 
must respect [the] choice” of states “to use a traditionally procedural 
vehicle as a means of defining the scope of substantive rights or 
remedies.”68  Justice Stevens, like Justice Ginsburg, leans on the 
statement from Gasperini that federal rules should be interpreted with 
 
just the sort of ‘incidental effec[t]’ [the Court has] long held does not violate [the REA].”  130 S. Ct. 
at 1443.  Affecting substantive political choices is simply not the same thing as “abridging, 
expanding, or modifying substantive rights.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added).  
Simply put, no plaintiff’s or defendant’s substantive rights are changed by the existence of the class 
action mechanism.  That a plaintiff might choose to exercise a preexisting right, as a result of Rule 
23, is of no relevance to the constitutional analysis. 
  Finally, Redish’s concerns about democratic accountability are overstated.  Congress can 
always—and in the case of the 1973 Federal Rules of Evidence, did—reject a rule.  See Act of Mar. 
30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.  Further, Congress has enacted a number of laws passing on 
or discussing Rule 23—indicating, through Article I bicameralism and presentment, its endorsement 
of the Rule.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (2006) (prohibiting use of class actions for 
immigration removal judicial review); 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006) (establishing procedures for private 
securities litigation class actions); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2006) (asserting Rule 23 representative 
plaintiff requirements for consumer product warranty class actions); 15 U.S.C. § 6614 (2006) 
(establishing requirements for class actions based on Y2K bug product defects); 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d) (2006) (extending federal diversity jurisdiction to cover class actions based on minimal 
diversity for disputes in excess of five million dollars). 
 65. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. at 1448. 
 67. Id. at 1456. 
 68. Id. at 1450. 
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“‘sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.’”69  
Notably, Justice Stevens states his disagreement with Justice Ginsburg’s 
application of RODA:  “I disagree with Justice Ginsburg . . . about the 
degree to which the meaning of federal rules may be contorted, absent 
congressional authorization to do so, to accommodate state policy 
goals.”70 
Justice Stevens takes Justice Scalia to task for ignoring the REA’s 
substantive rights limitation—suggesting that his test is no more difficult 
for courts to apply than that of the plurality, and that even if it were, 
Justice Scalia’s preference for bright-line rules “does not give us license 
to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act.  Courts 
cannot ignore text and context in the service of simplicity.”71  Summing 
up his view of Justice Scalia’s approach, Justice Stevens says:  “The 
plurality’s ‘test’ is no test at all—in a sense, it is little more than the 
statement that a matter is procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural.”72 
Applying his test, Justice Stevens finds first that Rule 23 controls 
the question of whether a class may be certified73 and that section 901(b) 
is not sufficiently interwoven with the state’s substantive law so as to 
pre-empt application of Rule 23.74  He cites the fact that section 901(b) 
applies to claims based on federal and other states’ laws,75 that it is 
found in the procedural section of the state’s code,76 and that the 
legislative history cited by Justice Ginsburg only demonstrated that there 
was “some policy reason”77 for the law—but that the legislature 
demonstrated a “classically procedural calibration of making it easier to 
litigate claims in New York courts (under any source of law) only when 
it is necessary to do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is 
not required.”78  Finally, he notes that Justice Ginsburg’s assertion that 
this turns a $500 case into a $5,000,000 case79 is incorrect—that it, in 
fact, turns 10,000 $500 cases into one $5,0000,000 case.80  In the end, 
 
 69. Id. at 1449 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)). 
 70. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451 n.5. 
 71. Id. at 1454. 
 72. Id. at 1454 n.10. 
 73. Id. at 1456. 
 74. Id. at 1459-60. 
 75. Id. at 1457. 
 76. Id. at 1460. 
 77. Id. at 1458 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 1459. 
 79. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 1459 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Justice Stevens finds the text of section 901(b) too straightforwardly 
procedural to make application of Rule 23 a violation of the REA.81 
In doing so, Justice Stevens clarifies his newly announced test to 
reflect the rarity with which a federal Rule will be found to violate the 
substantive rights limitation of the REA: 
The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests 
it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate and not a 
judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies.  And 
for the purposes of operating a federal court system, there are costs 
involved in attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural 
rule and allowing such a rule to operate alongside a federal rule that 
appears to govern the same question.  The mere possibility that a 
federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient.  There 
must be little doubt.82 
To be sure, Justice Stevens’s approach gives the superficial 
satisfaction of giving credence to the REA’s limitation on the federal 
Rules’ effects on substantive rights.  But the problem is that, just as he 
critiques Justice Scalia, Justice Steven’s test is also no test at all—for it 
will always lead to the same answer—application of the federal rule. 
 Justice Stevens states that it is “rare that a federal rule that is 
facially valid under [the REA] will displace a State’s definition of its 
own substantive rights.”83  Indeed, as Justice Stevens fashions his test, it 
is almost impossible to conceive of a state law that would ever be found 
to be “sufficiently interwoven” with the state’s definition of substantive 
rights, yet at the same time “ordinarily procedural” in form such that a 
court would ever reach the need to apply his test in the first place.  Any 
state law that is “ordinarily procedural” in its form, but “sufficiently 
interwoven” with the state’s substantive law, in such a way that there is 
“little doubt” the state meant it to be substantive, would simply not 
realistically be in direct conflict with a federal rule and, thus, would not 
be judged against the REA.  That is, the group of state laws about which 
Justice Stevens is concerned would be diverted off the REA track and 
into the regular RODA analysis, to determine, per Hanna, if application 
of the federal rule would lead to forum-shopping or an inequitable 
administration of laws.84 
 
 81. Id. at 1460. 
 82. Id. at 1457 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 1454 n.10. 
 84. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  
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As examples of state rules that are ordinarily procedural, but might 
be so interwoven as to require application over a contrary federal rule, 
Justice Stevens suggests that a rule about how damages are reviewed on 
appeal may actually be a substantive damages cap.  A statute of 
limitations rule might actually be “a limit on the existence of the right to 
seek redress,” and a standard of proof rule could really be a “definition 
of the scope of the claim.”85  However, these examples do not support 
his premise. 
His first example is a recitation of the facts of Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities.86  In Gasperini, a New York statute permitted appellate 
judges to order a new trial if a jury award “deviates materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation.”87  The Court rejected the argument 
that federal Rule 59(a), which allows for courts to grant new trials, was 
in direct collision with the New York statute.88  As such, the REA did 
not apply—there was no direct conflict between the federal rule and the 
state law.  Justice Stevens dissented in that case, but only on the 
disposition.  Notably, he agreed that “[b]ecause there is no conceivable 
conflict between [Rule] 59 and the application of the New York 
damages limit, this case is controlled by Erie and not the Rules Enabling 
Act’s limitation on federal procedural rules that conflict with state 
substantive rights.”89  As his first example of a state law that might be 
subject to his “sufficiently interwoven” test for the REA’s substantive 
rights limitation, Justice Stevens cited a law that he previously agreed is 
outside the scope of his test. 
 As to Justice Stevens’s other proposed candidates for his 
“sufficiently interwoven” test, there simply is no federal rule on point 
that would cause his test to even be applied to them.  “A rule that a 
plaintiff can bring a claim for only three years” that “may really be a 
limit on the existence of the right to seek redress,”90 would never be in 
direct conflict against a federal rule because there simply is no 
procedural federal rule establishing a statute of limitations.  In fact, it is 
long settled that statutes of limitations are substantive for Erie 
purposes91—so that again, RODA applies, not REA.  Finally, there is 
likewise no federal rule or statute on point establishing burdens of 
 
 85. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 86. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 87. Id. at 418; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 2010). 
 88. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438 n.22. 
 89. Id. at 440 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 91. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). 
. 
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proof—any potential conflict between a federal law and a state law 
would be handled under the RODA analysis. 
The fact that Justice Stevens could not come up with a relevant 
procedural state law that is so interwoven with a state’s substantive law 
so as to make application of a federal rule a violation of the REA (or 
even undergo his REA analysis) demonstrates that the initial appeal of 
his approach—that he gives muscle to the substantive rights limitation of 
the REA—is actually misplaced.  In practice, Justice Stevens’s test 
would simply lead to unnecessary confusion and require federal courts to 
“consider[] hundreds of state rules”92 when there is seemingly no chance 
that any rule that would be found substantive would undergo his test—
any such rule would be diverted off the REA track for lack of a direct 
conflict with a federal rule.  The analytical burden of Justice Stevens’s 
test outweighs its initial academic appeal.  As Justice Scalia concludes, 
“[t]he more one explores the alternatives to Sibbach’s rule, the more its 
wisdom becomes apparent.”93 
IV.  CONCLUSION:  FUTURE LITIGATION AND SHADY GROVE’S IRONY 
Shady Grove did little to clarify things.  Indeed—it seems to have 
made matters worse for those who might wish to understand the Court’s 
Erie doctrine.  Going forward, will Justice Scalia’s approach, true to 
Hanna and Sibbach, apply—or are courts to apply Justice Steven’s 
“sufficiently interwoven” test when a federal rule conflicts with a state 
law? 
Some commentators have suggested that Justice Stevens’s approach 
controls, citing the practice that when there is a plurality opinion, the 
narrower approach controls;94 however, it is hard to classify Justice 
Stevens’s as the “more narrow” opinion.  Against what benchmark are 
we to judge narrowness?  If deference to state procedural laws is the 
benchmark, perhaps, Justice Stevens’s opinion is more narrow.  But 
Justice Stevens’s test, as this paper has demonstrated, reaches the same 
result in all but potentially a few unascertainable cases, and in so doing, 
up-ends precedent in Hanna and Sibbach.  In that very real sense, Justice 
 
 92. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Ruling Opens Federal Courts to More Class 
Actions, THE NAT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1202447278574; Lyle Denniston, Analysis:  
Sorting Out an Erie Sequel, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2010, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/analysis-sorting-out-an-erie-sequel. 
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Scalia’s plurality opinion is the more narrow.  It certainly requires less 
analysis for future courts. 
 Justice Ginsburg asserts that “a majority of [the] Court, it bears 
emphasis, agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in 
diversity suits to accommodate important state concerns.”95  But only 
one justice—Justice Stevens—did so as part of the REA analysis, where 
a federal rule is in direct conflict with a state law.  The four dissenters 
ignored Justice Stevens’s plea that they join him in arguing under the 
REA framework.96  There was never any question that, under the RODA 
analysis conducted by the dissenters, important state interests should be 
considered.  So, in that sense, the only five justices to speak on the 
question of whether important state interests should be considered as 
part of a REA analysis are those in the plurality and Justice Stevens.  
Four justices say no; one justice says yes.  The other four—the Shady 
Grove dissenters—have not weighed in.  In that sense, Justice 
Ginsburg’s point does not bear as much emphasis as she suggests. 
 While Shady Grove’s result, as announced by the plurality 
decision, seems to best accord with the Court’s Erie jurisprudence and 
follow the most workable path for courts applying the Rules in diversity 
cases, one cannot help but remain alarmed by its result.  New York 
created a substantive cause of action and then decided, for whatever 
reason, that it did not want that action to be brought through the class 
action vehicle.  Permitting such claims to be brought as class actions in 
federal court seems unfair to defendants.  As Justice Ginsburg notes, the 
most effective way for Congress, should it be concerned with this 
outcome, to remedy this seemingly unfair result of a fair application of 
the Erie doctrine, is to pass a federal statute making diversity class 
actions unavailable in cases where the state providing the substantive 
law does not allow such claims to be brought as class actions in state 
court.97  
What is clear is the irony of this case, as Justice Ginsburg points 
out.98  Were it not for CAFA extending federal diversity jurisdiction to 
class actions with minimal diversity, Shady Grove could never have 
brought this action in federal court.  CAFA was passed for the express 
purpose of limiting the number of class actions, under the expectation 
that federal judges were less likely to certify class actions than state 
judges. 
 
 95. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 1473 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 1473. 
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If CAFA had worked as Congress had intended, then one would 
expect there to have been an increase in the number of class action 
removals from state court to federal court, and a decrease in class 
certifications overall.  In the immediate aftermath of CAFA, removals 
from state court did increase, but have since returned to pre-CAFA 
levels.99  What is anomalous and, perhaps, the most striking result of 
CAFA, is the dramatic increase in new original filings of class actions in 
federal court—that is, instances in which plaintiffs have chosen to file 
their class actions in federal, rather, than state court.100  Indeed, filings 
increased in district courts in eleven of the twelve circuits.101  Given the 
large number of district courts in which plaintiffs’ class action counsel 
can choose to file, it should not be altogether that surprising that they 
would use CAFA to file their actions strategically in federal district 
courts they find favorable, rather than be removed from favorable state 
courts into potentially unfavorable federal courts. 
CAFA was not the deathblow to class actions that some may have 
hoped it would be.  Indeed, CAFA seems to have led to results Congress 
did not expect:  an increase in the number of class actions in federal 
court, and now it has torpedoed a state’s attempt to rein in class actions.  
Shady Grove provides a stark example of what can happen when 
Congress tries to reach a substantive outcome—decreased liability for 
defendant businesses—by tinkering with procedural mechanisms and 
jurisdiction. 
 
 99. EMILY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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